PAVLICK_MUSIC LOCKERS

1/31/2013 5:26 PM

Music Lockers: Getting Lost in a Cloud of Infringement
Phillip Pavlick
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 248
I.THE CLOUD AND THE DMCA: “GIMME SHELTER” FROM
INFRINGEMENT ................................................................ 253
A. Cloud Computing: Bringing “Music Lockers” to a
Computer Near You ................................................. 253
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s
Limitations on Liability for Copyright
Infringement § 512: The Dual Goals of Internet
Copyright Law ......................................................... 256
C. “Help on the Way” The Copyright Owner’s
Remedy: Takedown and Notice ............................... 260
II.SAFE HARBOR OF § 512(C): LOST IN THE “PURPLE HAZE”
OF KNOWLEDGE ............................................................... 262
A. Clouds of Infringement: Vanishing of Actual and
Apparent Knowledge ............................................... 262
B. MP3tunes: “A Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fall” of
Copyright Infringement........................................... 267
III.“TOMORROW NEVER KNOWS” THE SCOPE OF
KNOWLEDGE IN § 512(C).................................................. 269
A. Apparent Knowledge: “Huh, Good God, What is it
Good For?, Absolutely Nothing” .............................. 270
B. Actual Knowledge: Does it Exist? ............................. 273
C. Liability and Protection in the Cloud: Can
Copyright Owners Protect Their Works in the
Cloud ........................................................................ 275
IV. A BALANCE OF INTERESTS IN PREVENTING
INFRINGEMENT ................................................................ 277
A. The Audio Home Recording Act: Framework for A
Future....................................................................... 278
B. “Do You Realize??” The Need for a New Statutory
License...................................................................... 279
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 280

247

PAVLICK_MUSIC LOCKERS

248

1/31/2013 5:26 PM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.1

INTRODUCTION
A group of friends networking and trading information and
files over the Internet may do so legally. These particular
friends, however, employ a service devoted solely to the online
storage for songs, called a “music locker.” They share access
by using a common username and password.
Each
participant places songs in storage, which every other
contributor may then download to their own personal
computer. It seems harmless at first, but soon the storage
space contains 200,000 songs, none of which anyone legally
purchased. Under certain circumstances, they would face
liability for copyright infringement, but copyright owners lack
the ability to discover that this is occurring. Nor can they rely
on help from the online service provider (OSP) whose service
became the tool for infringement because the law, as
interpreted by the courts, provides an almost complete shield
against copyright infringement for “music lockers.” The law
allows the OSP to remain complacent, without fear of
liability. This is the case even if the OSP knows of the
infringement or, in some instances, facilitates it.
United States Copyright Law contains numerous examples
where courts sought to adapt the law to technological
innovations by harmonizing its interpretation to allow for the
inclusion of these advancements.1 The explosive growth of
technology and the Internet over the last two decades led to
wildfire-like growth of copyright infringement2 due to the
new-found ease in producing and distributing high quality
copies of protected works.3 As technology and infringement
continue to expand, both the legislature and courts struggle to
1. See, e.g., Burrow-Gile Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Midway
Mfg., Co. v. Artic Int’l., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
2. See Scope of the Problem, RIAA.COM, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?
content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-the-problem (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). Since
the advent of Napster and other peer-to-peer filling sharing services, U.S. music sales
have dropped from $14.6 billion to $7.7 billion, a 47 percent decrease. Id. Digital
piracy of copyrighted content is estimated to take up 24 percent of global bandwidth
and 17.5 percent of the bandwidth in the United States. Id. Estimates indicate that
around 30 billion songs were downloaded illegally between 2004 and 2009. Id.
3. See generally Nika Aldrich,
An Exploration of Rights Management
Technologies Used in the Music Industry, 2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1 (2007);
Fred von Lohman, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the
Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635 (2004).
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maintain the balance between technology and the integrity of
artistic works protected under United States intellectual
property laws.
The struggle to protect copyrighted musical works on the
Internet gained public notoriety with the music industry’s
challenge of peer-to-peer file sharing services, such as
Napster and bittorrent providers.4 Now the music industry
fears that “music lockers” will become a conduit for
infringement.5 “Music lockers” present copyright owners with
greater challenges in combating infringement than those
faced in their attempts to thwart infringers who plied the
pathways of peer-to-peer services.
Until recently, very few OSPs employed what is known as
“cloud computing” to provide subscribers with an online
application designed for the limited purpose of storing one’s
music library,6 but Google, Amazon, and iTunes all recently
released their own versions of “music lockers.”7 iTunes, prior
to the introduction of its “music locker,” obtained licenses
from the major labels permitting it to store copyrighted
songs.8 By receiving a license, iTunes negated any possibility
of subjecting itself to copyright infringement liability from the
4. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Inc., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 21, 2009); See also Ankur R. Patel, Comment, Bittorrent Beware: Legitimizing
Bittorrent Against Secondary Copyright Liability, 12 APPALACHIAN L.J. 117 (2011);
Johnathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2006).
5. See generally Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Timothy B. Lee, Are Google and Amazon’s Cloud Players Illegal,
CNN.COM (July 11, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-11/tech/google.music.
clour.ars_1_mp3-com-major-music-labels-sony-music?_s=PM:TECH;
Ryan
Singel,
Amazon, Dropbox, Google, and you win in cloud-music decision, CNN.COM (Aug. 23,
2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-23/tech.cloud.music.copyright.decision.wired_
1_amazon-s-cloud-drive-hard-drive-google-music?_s=PM:TECH; Peter Tschmuck, There
is Music in the Cloud, MUSIC BUSINESS RESEARCH (June 7, 2011),
http://musicbusinessresearch.wordpress.com/2011/06-/07/there-is-music-in-the-cloud.
6. For the last several years, cloud computing has been used by OSPs to give
users a storage space for data, such as documents or even music, but none had
developed a storage service devoted solely for the storage of music besides MP3tunes.
See, e.g., DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2012); GOOGLE
CLOUD PLATFORM, https://cloud.google.com/products/cloud-storage (last visited Oct. 17,
2012).
7. Called Google Music Beta, Amazon Cloud Player, and iTunes Scan and Match
respectively. Lee, supra note 5.
8. Id.
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major labels.9
Amazon and Google, however, after
unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate licenses, chose to
proceed without the blessing of music labels, thereby, creating
the risk of liability.10 Instead, Amazon and Google placed
their reliance on the safe harbors found in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), specifically the
affirmative defense provided by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).11
Initially, proceeding without licenses meant Google and
Amazon faced the very real threat of liability for contributory
infringement,12
since, at the time of their services
9. iTunes does face liability from minor record labels if a user uploads a song
from such a label if it did not negotiate licenses with the smaller labels. Id.
10. Id. Since finishing this comment, about a year after first offering its cloud
service, Amazon obtained licenses from all major music labels for its cloud storage
service. See Greg Sandoval, Amazon’s music cloud is licensed by all top labels, CNET
(June 15, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57453873-93/amazonsmusic-cloud-is-licensed-by-all-top-labels. To date, however, Google has yet to obtain
licenses from the music labels. But, even though, Amazon has since garnered licenses,
it faced the possibility of liability for infringement for nearly a year.
11. (c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.
(1) In general. – A service provider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of
copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider, if that service provider:
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using
the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, act expeditiously to remove,
or disable access, to the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
12. “Contributory infringement occurs when a defendant induces, causes, or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, with knowledge of the
infringing activity.” 3-12A Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12A.01(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2012); see, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (finding a peer-to-peer service
provider liable for contributory infringement because it induced its users to commit
direct infringement); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (discussing whether a manufacturer of video cassette recorders could be liable
for contributory infringement for owners of the recorders who use them to copy
television programs); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding plaintiff could state a claim for contributory infringement against the owner of
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announcement, it remained uncertain whether “music
lockers” could qualify for protection under § 512(c).13 Judge
William Pauley answered this question, at least for the
interim,14 by holding that a “music locker” could qualify for
the safe harbor of § 512(c) if the OSP met its requirements.15
Judge Pauley’s ruling sustained the trend began by previous
courts, which continually frustrates the music industry’s
efforts to protect its works on the Internet. In reaching his
decision, Judge Pauley employed a standard of apparent
knowledge that, in fact, is actual knowledge. And, further,
the standard of actual knowledge Judge Pauley and other
courts currently employ effective eliminates any possibility of
finding it exists, absent the copyright owner actually
informing the OSP of that specific infringement.16
The definitions of apparent and actual knowledge
employed by the courts, along with the courts’ strict
requirements for issuing a compliant takedown notice,17
create substantial hurdles for copyright owners who endeavor
a swap meet when it was aware vendors sold recordings that infringed the plaintiffs’
copyrights).
13. Amazon, Google, and iTunes all announced their music lockers prior to the
decision in MP3tunes. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Lee, supra note 5.
14. Capitol Records plans to appeal the decision. Christopher S. Harrison, Capital
Punishment? EMI Wins Battle but May Lose War, MUSIC LAW SEMINAR (Aug. 29, 2011),
http://musiclawseminar.com/2011/08/29/capital-punishment-emi-wins-the-battle-butmay-lose-war.
15. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 650-51.
16. See Keith Black, Note, Technical Knockout: How Mixed Martial Arts Will
Change Copyright Infringement on the Web, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 739, 773 (2011); Liliana Chang, Note, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge
Under the DMCA §512(c) Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 203 (2010);
See also § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
17. (3) Elements of notification:
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed
infringement . . . [must] include[] substantially the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of
the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing, or, if multiple
works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a
representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to
be disable, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate the material.
DMCA § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(iii).
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to prevent infringement on “music lockers.”18 This note will
examine the safe harbor and takedown procedures found in §
512(c) and its application to “music lockers.”
It will
demonstrate that the courts’ interpretation of § 512(c) shields
OSPs from liability by misconstruing the standards of actual
and apparent knowledge as enacted by Congress. This
misapplication creates barriers that inhibit the music
industry’s ability to combat infringement on “music lockers”
because their characteristics make issuing a takedown notice
a practical impossibility. In addition, the combination of
heightened knowledge standards and the copyright holders’
inability to issue takedown notices has the potential to allow
“music lockers” to become safe harbors for infringement.
Part I A will provide background on the general aspects of
cloud computing as employed by “music lockers” while
identifying the differences among Amazon, Google, and
iTunes’s “music lockers.” Part I B discusses the safe harbor
provision and the notice and takedown procedures provided
by § 512(c) of the DMCA. Part II examines the development
of the application § 512(c)’s knowledge and takedown
provisions through case law. Part III develops a functional
standard for assessing the liability of a “music locker,” which
is based on courts’ decision construing § 512(c). Part IV poses
alternative solutions that would ensure that copyright owners
received compensation for the use of their works on “music
lockers” without subjecting the OSPs to liability for
contributory infringement.

18. Not only do the courts’ interpretations of § 512(c) have ramifications on the
music industry in preventing infringement on cloud services but also the video game
industry, as there have been recent shifts to increasingly employ cloud computing in
the distribution and storage of video games. See IGDA Chief: Cloud Gaming Costs to
Rise, GAMESPOT.COM (Jan. 17, 2012, 2:39 AM), http://www.gamespot.com/news/igdachief-cloud-gaming-costs-to-rise-6348679; see, e.g., ONLIVE, http://www.onlive.com (last
visited Oct. 17, 2012).
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I. THE CLOUD AND THE DMCA: “GIMME SHELTER”19 FROM
INFRINGEMENT
A. Cloud Computing: Bringing “Music Lockers” to a Computer
Near You
The increasing use and popularity of cloud computing is
attributable to the efficiencies and cost savings it provides.20
Early development and implementation of cloud computing
occurred in the private sector, but since that time, its
application has expanded to the public sector.21 “Music
lockers,” such as those offered by Amazon, Google, and
iTunes, are only made available through the use of cloud
computing.22 An apt analogy is that “music lockers” are
external hard drives on which only songs can be stored, but
instead of connecting to the computer via a USB cable one
connects to it through the Internet.23
All uses of cloud computing are classified as one of three
models; platform as a service (PaaS), infrastructure as a
service (IaaS), or software as a service (SaaS).24 “Music
lockers” constitute SaaS;25 other SaaS providers, that many
are familiar with, include YouTube and Facebook.26 SaaS
clouds are accessible through the Internet by using a web
browser27 or through downloadable applications, or “apps.”28
19.
20.

THE ROLLING STONES, Gimme Shelter, on LET IT BLEED (Decca 1969).
LEE BADGER ET AL., DRAFT CLOUD COMPUTING SYNOPSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 5-4 (2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800146/Draft-INST-SP800-146.pdf; Asher Kent, Cloud Computing and the RIAA, ARTHUR’S
LAW INDUSTRY INSIDER (June 20, 2011), http://artherworldblog.wordpress.com/
2011/06/20/cloud-computing-an-the-riaa.
21. Id.
22. Tschmuck, supra note 5.
23. Id.
24. BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 2-1-2-2.
25. See id.
26. Marc Aaron Melzer, Copyright Enforcement in the Cloud, 21 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 403, 405 (2011). Megaupload was also a SaaS cloud platform
before the Federal Government shut it down. See id. See, Jeremy Pelofsky, U.S.
accuses Megaupload of copyright infringement, REUTERS (Jan 19, 2012 6:23 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-usa-crime-piracyidUSTRE80I2422012011, for a discussion Megaupload’s copyright infringement, which
demonstrates the concerns that the music industry has over the development of cloud
storage for songs.
27. BADGER ET AL, supra note 20, at 2-1.
28. Amazon, Google, and iTunes’s “music locker” programs are downloaded as
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A user in a SaaS cloud, unlike a user in PaaS and IaaS
clouds, exercises little control of the cloud.29 Instead, the OSP
retains much of the influence over the program’s features.30
Broad network access is an essential characteristic of
cloud based “music lockers,”31 meaning that a user may access
a “music locker” through standard internet-capable devices
connected to the network.32 These devices include cellphones,
laptops, and tablets.33 The free sharing and access of other
users’ files, provided by broad network access, is what makes
it so attractive.34 Yet, the same reasons for its attractiveness,
also makes it a potential threat as a vehicle for infringement.
“Music lockers,” however, contrary to the majority of broad
network access services, do not allow the free exchange of files
between users.35 Instead, a user’s music catalog remains
viewable and accessible only to that user. While this may at
first appear beneficial to copyright holders by making
infringement more difficult, they fear users will share
passwords.
In addition, copyright holders are also
apprehensive due to the lockers’ inaccessibility, which make it
challenging to adequately identify and locate incidents of
infringement.36
“Music lockers” can employ one of two methods to store the
songs on their servers.37 The first method involves the OSP
storing an individual copy of each song uploaded for every
user,38 potentially resulting in the OSP storing millions of
identical copies of the same song. This option comes with two
prominent draw backs: (1) long upload times for users
compared to other storage methods because of massive

apps for phones, tablets, PCs, and other devices with such functionality.
29. BADGER ET AL, supra note 20, at 2-1; Melzer, supra note 26, at 410.
30. BADGER ET AL, supra note 20, at 2-1; Melzer, supra note 26, at 410.
31. Melzer, supra note 26, at 409. YouTube and Facebook are also broad network
access services. Id. at 405, 408.
32. BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 2-1; see also Melzer supra note 26, at 407-08.
33. BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 2-1; Melzer, supra note 26, at 408.
34. Melzer, supra note 26, at 407; see also BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 5-1.
35. See, BADGER ET AL., supra note 20, 5-6-5-7 for a description of how a SaaS
provider can isolate users preventing the free sharing of files.
36. This is due to the required specificity of notice in issuing a compliant takedown
notice. See infra Part I.C.
37. Tschmuck, supra note 5.
38. Id.
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bandwidth usage,39 and (2) it requires the OSP to devote more
servers to storage capabilities than it may need to otherwise.40
Google and Amazon both elected to employ this storage
option, despite its shortcomings, for legal reasons.41 Both still
remain uncertain as to whether a “music locker” can qualify
for the safe harbor of § 512(c) because of the potential reversal
of Judge Pauley’s decision in MP3tunes on appeal. As a result
of this uncertainty, Amazon and Google continue to store
songs this way because it would allow them to assert a
defense based on the Second Circuit’s holding in Cartoon
Network, L.L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc.42 In Cartoon Network,
the defendant, a cable provider, was held not liable for
contributory infringement when its customers used digital
recording devices to copy television programs because the
court determined that the users, not the cable provider,
created the infringing copies.43 For the same reasons that the
court found the defendant not liable in Cartoon Network,
Amazon and Google hope to garner a similar declaration if
sued for infringement because their users direct the locker to
make the copies of the songs.44
The second storage method which OSPs may employ is “a
‘real’ cloud based solution.”45 When using this option the OSP
divides an uploaded song into separate digital portions.46
These portions are called hash tags and are later used to
identify and reassemble the song when users wish to
download or stream it from their lockers.47 If another user
uploads a song that the OSP already created hash tags for,
the OSP will recognize the song through the previously made
hash tags, and then delete the newly created, redundant
tags.48 Essentially, the OSP server stores a single copy of a

39. Singel, supra note 5
40. Id.
41. Lee, supra note 5.
42. Cartoon Network, L.L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); see
also Lee, supra note 5.
43. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 140.
44. Lee, supra note 5.
45. Tschmuck supra note 5.
46. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 821, 634 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
47. Id.
48. See id.
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song, which all users owning that song share.49 Because an
OSP does not need to store multiple copies of the same song it
is left with other options to employ its resources. It can either
devote server space to other purposes, or it can forego the use
of extra servers, thereby, saving on costs.50 Also, not only do
OSPs reap the rewards of the “‘real’ cloud based solution”51
but users also benefit by experiencing shorter upload times
than the method employed by Google and Amazon allows.52
As for the legality of this method of storage, MP3tunes
created hash tags to store its music,53 and the court in
permitting MP3tunes the safe harbor of § 512(c) paved the
way for Google and Amazon to adopt this method.54 Dropbox,
a SaaS cloud storage service, though not a “music locker,” also
employs hash tags for all users’ files uploaded: including
movies, documents, and songs.55 iTunes, not fearing liability
because of the licenses it obtained from the music labels,56
chose this approach for storage as well.57
Cloud computing, as applied in “music lockers,” offers
OSPs innovative approaches to develop new services for users
which can benefit the music industry by limiting a user’s
ability to commit infringement. But, as with most other
online services, it can also facilitate infringement. As a result
of the insulation offered by the “music lockers,” hurdles exist
for copyright holders in combating infringement unless the
OSPs aid copyright holders in their enforcement efforts.
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Limitations on
Liability for Copyright Infringement § 512: The Dual
49. Tschmuck, supra note 5.
50. Singel, supra note 5.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Capitol Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 634; see also Singel, supra note 5.
54. The OSP, however, would not be able to use that same song file merely because
it possessed the same song title; all aspects of the uploaded file must be identical.
Singel, supra note 5.
55. Id.
56. Lee, supra note 5. iTunes is free to use master copies of songs, in addition to
hash marks, and does not have to worry about matching file sizes and other aspects of
uploaded files because of the licenses. Singel, supra note 5. Further, iTunes scan and
match also provides users with a higher quality copy of a song if the song the user
uploads quality is inferior compared to that available on iTunes. Id.
57. Tschmuck, supra note 5.
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Goals of Internet Copyright Law
The Constitution empowers Congress with the ability to
promote the advancement of science and art by securing
monopolies for creators for a limited time for their works.58
With the rise of the digital age and the expansion of the
Internet, the monopolies granted to musical works faced
increasing threats of infringement.59 In order to provide
copyright holders with “reasonable assurance that they will
be protected against massive piracy,”60 and to provide
assurance to OSPs by clarifying their liability,61 Congress
passed the DMCA in 1998.62 The act was an attempt to
balance the concerns of both copyright owners and OSPs in its
approach to infringement63 and, thereby, promote both the
sciences and the arts.
First, the DMCA departed from previous copyright laws in
one of its two articles by focusing on preventing parties from
tampering with tools, known as digital rights management
(DRM),64 which are imbedded in copyrighted works to prevent
potential infringers from copying the work.65 Thus, instead of
protecting the copyrighted works themselves, Congress chose
to protect the means of protection. Congress provided these
protections fearing that “copyright owners [would] hesitate to
make their works readily available on the Internet without
reasonable assurance that they [would] be protected against
massive piracy.”66
The other portion of the act, found in the safe harbors of §
512, addresses the concerns of OSPs by offering them,
“greater certainty . . . concerning their legal exposure for
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
59. See Scope of the Problem, supra note 2.
60. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
61. Id.
62. The DMCA created 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-5, 1301-1332, 28, and it amended §§
101, 104, 104A, 108, 112, 114, 117, 701 (2006).
63. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8.
64. DRM has been largely unsuccessful in preventing infringement of musical
works compared with other industries is which it is used. See Aldrich, supra note 3
(discussing types of DRM employed by copyright owners in the entertainment
industry).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see also; Lohman, supra note 3 at 638. See generally
Aldrich, supra note 3.
66. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8.
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infringements . . . .”67 To fulfill this goal, § 512 contributes a
set of affirmative defenses, “if the provider is found to be
liable under existing principles of law.”68 The limitations on
liability do not completely shelter OSPs; they merely lay out a
framework of conditions, which if met, allow an OSP to assert
one of § 512’s defenses.69
Section 512 grants protection to four types of OSPs:
transitory digital network communications;70 system
caching;71 information residing on systems or networks at the
direction of users;72 and information location tools.73 Of the
four, “music lockers” qualify for § 512(c), because a user’s
songs are stored on the “music locker’s” system or network at
the direction of the user.74
Yet, before an OSP can claim the protection under one of
the safe harbors of § 512(a)-(d), it must first meet § 512(i)’s
threshold requirements.75 The subsection prescribes that an
OSP institute a policy which provides for the termination of
users who are guilty of repeated incidents of infringement.76
And, the service provider must reasonably implement that
policy while informing its subscribers of its existence.77 In
addition, the OSP must also accommodate, and not interfere
with, standard technological measures employed by copyright
owners.78 Only if the OSP adheres to the strictures of § 512(i)
can the analysis proceed to the requirements of the safe
67. Id. at 40.
68. Id. at 19. The affirmative defenses found in § 512 primarily address
circumstances where the OSP would be liable for contributory infringement.
69. Id. at 41; see 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
70. § 512(a).
71. § 512(b).
72. § 512(c).
73. § 512(d).
74. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 628, 646
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding a “music locker” qualifies for the safe harbor of § 512(c)).
75. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007); Io Group,
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
76. § 512(i)(1)(A).
77. Id.
78. § 512(i)(1)(B). Standard technological measures can be inferred are the DRM
protected under 17 U.S.C. §1201, 1202 (2012). See generally Susuk Lim, Note, A Survey
of the DMCA’s Copyright Management Information Protections: The DMCA’s CMI
Landscape After All Headline News and McClatchey, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 297
(2011) (discussing the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA and case law
regarding those provisions).
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harbors in § 512(a)-(d).79
In order to raise § 512(c) as a defense to contributory
infringement, the OSP must not have been aware of the
alleged infringement.80
Section 512(c) determines the
presence of such awareness through the dichotomy of actual
and apparent knowledge. An OSP is said not to possess
actual knowledge if it is unaware of the infringing material
the user placed on its system or network.81 As for apparent
knowledge,82 the OSP cannot have an awareness of “facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”83
To facilitate a court’s determination of whether an OSP
possesses apparent knowledge, Congress developed a “red
flag.”84 The test contains both a subjective and an objective
element.85 According to the subjective element, the court
must determine the facts and circumstances under which the
OSP labored when the complaining party located the alleged
infringement.86 The objective test then directs the court to
ask, under the previously ascertained circumstances,
“whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a
reasonable person operating under the same or similar
circumstances.”87 But, even if an OSP possesses either actual
or apparent knowledge of infringement, it may still claim the
shelter of § 512(c) if it acts, “expeditiously to remove or
disable access to the infringing material.”88
Yet, even if an OSP never actually or apparently knew of
infringement, it may still find itself disqualified from § 512(c)
if it receives a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringement89 and maintains the ability and right to control
the infringement. 90 The financial benefit is attributable to
79. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 51-52 (1998).
80. See § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
81. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
82. See Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (describing the test under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) as a test for apparent knowledge).
83. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
84. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44.
89. § 512(c)(1)(B); see also CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688,
704-5 (D.C. Md. 2001).
90. § 512(c)(1)(B); see also Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d
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infringement if the OSP employs a discriminatory pricing
scheme, where infringing and non-infringing users pay
but when the OSP’s pricing plan is
different rates;91
nondiscriminatory, it will not lead to its disqualification from
§ 512(c).92 An OSP has the ability and right to control
infringement if a defendant exercises control over a direct
infringer when he has both a legal right to stop or limit the
activity, as well as the practical ability to do so.93 Liability
only exists when both of the above conditions exist.94
Finally, the OSP must designate an agent with the
Register of Copyrights to receive takedown notices from
copyright holders.95 If the agent receives a takedown notice,
in compliance with § 512(c)(3), the OSP must disable access
and remove the infringing material from its system or
network.96 When an OSP fails to adequately respond to a
valid takedown notice, it becomes liable for the identified
infringement, because the takedown notice then becomes the
basis for the imputation of actual knowledge to the OSP.97
C. “Help on the Way”98 The Copyright Owner’s Remedy:
Takedown and Notice
In Section 512(c)(3), the DMCA affords copyright owners
the means to protect his or her works from infringement
through a takedown notice. The takedown compels OSPs to
remove and disable access to identified infringing material.99
In order for a takedown notice to obligate an OSP to act, it
1132, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1109-10 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
91. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44
92. Cf. id.
93. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007).
94. Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1109. It is difficult to conceptualize
circumstances when an OSP could be found liable based on receiving a direct financial
benefit from infringement and having the ability to control it, while lacking knowledge
of infringement, because the OSP would need knowledge of infringement to institute a
pricing plan that is discriminatory and, also, to control it.
95. § 512(c)(2).
96. § 512(c)(3)(C); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45.
97. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 648-49
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
98. THE GRATEFUL DEAD, Help on the Way, on BLUES FOR ALLAH (United Artists
1975).
99. § 512(c)(1)(C).
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must meet § 512(c)(3)’s firm guidelines.
Of these strictures, two especially salient requirements
exist, and unlike the other requirements of § 512(c), these are
not merely procedural. First, the takedown must identify the
work subject to infringement.100 If several works are the
target of the infringement, a representative list of works is
sufficient.101 The reasoning for requiring such specificity is to
inform the OSP of the scope of the infringement.102 In
addition, a description of the location of the alleged
infringement, enabling the OSP to easily locate it, must
accompany the representative list.103 The URL address where
the infringement resides sufficiently serves as a form of
location.104
When a copyright owner issues an OSP a takedown notice
complying with § 512(c)(3)’s strictures, the OSP must disable
and remove access to the infringing material or face
liability.105 Liability results because courts may then impute
knowledge to the OSP, based on receipt of the copyright
holder’s notice.106 If the takedown notice fails to substantially
comply with the prescriptions of § 512(c)(3),107 however, the
OSP has no duty to act, nor can the notice be used by a court
to impute knowledge.108

100. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
101. Id. “[I]t is not necessary for a compliant notification to list every musical
composition or sound recording that has been or could be infringed at that site, so long
as a representative list of those compositions or recordings is provided so that the
service provider can understand the nature and scope of the infringement being
claimed.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46.
102. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46.
103. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
104. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46.
105. § 512(c)(1)(C); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627,
640 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
106. See § 512(c)(1)(C), (c)(3)(B)(i); see also Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at
648.
107. “[S]ubstantial compliance standard in subsections . . . (c)(3) be applied so that
technical errors . . . do not disqualify . . . copyright owners from the protections afforded
under subsection (c).” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47. Errors that a copyright owner may
commit while still substantially complying include typos and failures to update
information such names or addresses. Id.
108. § 512(c)(3)(B); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill
L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007).
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II. SAFE HARBOR OF § 512(C): LOST IN THE “PURPLE HAZE”109 OF
KNOWLEDGE
A. Clouds of Infringement: Vanishing of Actual and Apparent
Knowledge
Since the inception of the DMCA’s safe harbors, courts
have grappled over the appropriate application of the
knowledge dichotomy in § 512(c).110 And, in the end, the
standards courts adopted exasperate copyright owners
because they permit OSPs to operate until they receive a
takedown notice from a complaining party, even though they
are aware of the presence of infringement. This frustration is
due, in large part, to a heightened standard of actual
knowledge and an interpretation of apparent knowledge that
confuses itself with actual knowledge.111
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC became one of the first cases
to truly address the knowledge requirements under § 512(c).
112
Perfect 10, an adult entertainment magazine, filed suit
against CCBill alleging that images posted by users on
CCBill’s services were stolen, and, as such, infringed upon
Perfect 10’s copyright in those images.113
Prior to the
commencement of litigation, Perfect 10 sent multiple letters
and emails to CCBill’s designated agent to receive takedown
notices, thereby alerting it of the infringement.114 However, it
never transmitted a statutorily compliant takedown notice.
The court, after determining CCBill met the threshold
requirements of § 512(i),115 considered whether it held
apparent knowledge of infringement under the “red flag”
test.116 Perfect 10 asserted that names of websites117 and
password hacking sites hosted by CCBill constituted “red

109. JIMI HENDRIX, Purple Haze, on ARE YOU EXPERIENCED (MCA Records 1967).
110. See Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d 1102; Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586
F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008). See generally Black, supra note 16; Chang, supra
note 16.
111. Black, supra note 16, at 773; Chang, supra note 16, at 203.
112. See Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d 1102.
113. Id. at 1108.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1109; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006).
116. Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1114.
117. Names of the websites included illegal.net and stolencelebritypics.com. Id.
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flags.”118 In order to determine if those websites infringed
copyrights, the court found that CCBill would need to undergo
The court declined to impose such
investigations.119
investigative duties on an OSP; therefore, no “per se ‘red flags’
of infringement” existed.120
Perfect 10 also endeavored to convince the court to impute
knowledge to CCBill based on the emails and letters it
previously sent.121
After examining each piece of
correspondence separately the court found that each letter
and email individually failed to substantially comply with §
512(c)(3).122 Thus, they could not provide a basis for the
imputation of knowledge.123 “[A] notification must do more
than identify the infringing files. The DMCA requires a
complainant to declare, under penalty of perjury, that he is
authorized to represent the copyright holder and that he has
a good-faith belief that the use is infringing.”124 In so stating,
the court indicated the strict standard copyright owners
would be held to in ensuring that notices strictly complied
with § 512(c)(3), and that mere mistakes may not be
excused.125
Following Perfect 10, a court next addressed § 512(c) in Io
Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.126 Io brought suit against
Veoh, claiming that ten adult videos, ranging from clips of a
few seconds to twenty minutes, were posted on Veoh without
permission and infringed Io’s copyright in those films.127 In a
somewhat astonishing declaration, the court held no actual
knowledge existed because, “[Io] provided no notice to Veoh of
any claimed copyright infringement. Thus, there [remained]
no question . . . that Veoh lacked actual knowledge of the

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court inferred that an OSP need not undergo an investigation due to
17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1), which states that nothing in subsections (a) through (d) requires
a “service provider [to monitor] its service or affirmatively [seek] facts indicating
infringing activity.” § 512(m)(1).
121. Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1111-13.
122. Id. at 1113.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1112.
125. But see S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47.
126. Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
127. Id. at 1136.
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alleged infringing activity at issue.”128
Turning to whether Veoh had apparent knowledge, the
court stated that “the question is not what a reasonable
person would have deduced given all the circumstances,”129
but whether the OSP “turned a blind eye to red flags of
infringement.”130Finding no evidence of apparent knowledge
and lack of notice from Io, Veoh obtained shelter under the
umbrella of § 512(c).131
Soon after the decision in Io Group, Veoh became the
target of another infringement action instituted by Universal
Music Group (UMG).132 UMG argued that Veoh possessed
actual knowledge of infringing material beyond the works
which Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) cited
in a previously transmitted takedown notice.133 UMG claimed
that Veoh had actual knowledge because it knew that it was
not permitted to host music content subject to copyright
protection yet still permitted users to upload it,134 and that
the list of artists in the RIAA’s previous takedown notice
provided actual knowledge of infringement of all of those
artists’ works that were uploaded to Veoh thereafter.135 The
court, however, rejected these arguments, because they would
require Veoh to perform searches, and “the DMCA notification
procedures place the burden of policing copyright
infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material
and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the
owners of the copyright.”136
The court next concluded that while Veoh was generally
aware of the existence of infringement on its service, such
awareness could not reach the level required to constitute
apparent knowledge.137 The court’s decision was based on the
128. Id. at 1148.
129. Id. (citing Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D.
Wash. 2004)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1154-1155.
132. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
133. Id. at 1108.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1109.
136. Id. at 1110; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2007).
137. UMG Recordings, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
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fact that UMG could not cite any authority that general
awareness results in apparent knowledge.138 Yet, the court,
itself, neglected to provide any specific authority for its
rationale that general awareness does not constitute apparent
knowledge.139 Although, the court did attempt to construct a
tenuous connection to the Senate Report by citing it when
trying to establish its proposition: the “safe harbor would not
serve its purpose of ‘facilitate[ing] the robust development
and . . . expansion of electronic commerce, communications,
research, development, and education in the digital age.’”140
This citation, however, is to the general purpose of the
DMCA,141 and leads to no inferences that general awareness
cannot constitute apparent knowledge.
Many of the same arguments offered by the plaintiff in
UMG Recordings were later raised in Viacom Int’l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc.142 Viacom claimed that the prevalence of
infringement was to such an extent that the it alone raised
YouTube’s level of awareness to actual knowledge.143 The
court continued the trend begun in UMG Recordings,144
holding that widespread infringement could not result in
knowledge because “[m]ere knowledge of prevalence of such
activity in general is not enough.”145 The court went a step
further though, by clarifying what it would consider to
constitute apparent knowledge: there must be instances “of
specific and identifiable infringements of particular individual
items.”146
Viacom also claimed that YouTube should face liability
because it failed to comply with its takedown notice.147 Upon
receipt of the notice, YouTube only disabled access to videos
whose location Viacom specifically identified, but declined to
remove identical videos located elsewhere on the site.148
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 1111 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998)).
141. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1-2.
142. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d
on other grounds, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
143. Id. at 518.
144. UMG Recordings, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
145. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 528.
148. Id.

PAVLICK_MUSIC LOCKERS

266

1/31/2013 5:26 PM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.1

Quashing Viacom’s argument, the court averred that
requiring OSPs to remove infringing material when the
copyright owner identified no location would “eviscerate the
required specificity of notice.”149 A representative list was
sufficient to identify the works subject to infringement, but
the duty to disable and remove access only extended to those
works for which Viacom supplied a specific location.150
Therefore, YouTube, having disabling access to the infringing
material at the identified locations, avoided liability, at least
momentarily because of §512(c).151
Recently, the Second Circuit, affirmed the District Court’s
construction of the both knowledge standards in Viacom but
remanded the case for further determination as to whether
YouTube was, in fact, aware of specific facts and
circumstances of infringement and/or willfully blind to
infringement.152 So, while the Court of Appeals chastised the
District Court for its application § 512(c)’s knowledge
provisions to the case’s facts, it endorsed the general
assertion, made by many of the decisions previously
discussed,
that
apparent
knowledge
requires
the
identification of specific incidents of infringement of which the
OSP knew, or that the OSP turned a blind eye to
infringement in order to be liable.153
The courts, in developing the jurisprudence of § 512(c),
have limited the scope of apparent knowledge and actual
knowledge, easing the fear that OSPs might become liable for
users’ infringement. At the same time, however, courts
149. Id. at 528-9; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2006).
150. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528-9.
151. Id. at 529.
152. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2012).
153. See generally YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19. Some may claim the Second Circuit’s
decision signals a sea change in the application of § 512(c), but this author believes that
the decision is largely a pyrrhic victory for copyright holders, at least in terms of the
interpretation of § 512(c), because no court could justifiably ignore the blatant disregard
for infringement that was evidenced in the internal emails and reports of YouTube
employees and executives. See id. at 32-34 (discussing the evidence demonstrating that
YouTube was aware of the infringement). And, thus, it remains to be seen how this will
have an effect on less blatant defendants, or where the infringement is not as expansive
as on YouTube. Further, one might even argue that YouTube’s actions show that it, in
fact, facilitated and induced infringement, and an OSP which induces infringement is
provided no defense by § 512. See infra, note 218. Although, the decision does indicate,
that OSPs will not automatically be awarded summary judgment simply by raising the
specter of § 512(c).
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established that they would hold copyright owners to a high
standard in issuing takedown notices that meet the statutory
criteria of § 512(c)(3).
B. MP3tunes: “A Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fall”154 of Copyright
Infringement
The most recent decision involving the application of §
512(c)’s safe harbor occurred in Capitol Records, Inc. v.
MP3tunes, LLC.155 The defendant, MP3tunes, one of the first
“music locker” providers, operated with membership terms
akin to those of Amazon and Google’s lockers.156 MP3tunes’s
locker, however, functioned more like iTunes’s “music locker,”
particularly with regards to the storage method employed.157
MP3tunes’ locker, in addition to the standard features
present in Amazon, Google, and iTunes’s lockers, also
“Sideload”
contained an application called “sideload.”158
functioned as a search engine, allowing users to enter a song
or artist into it.159
“Sideload” then located free music
available on third-party websites that matched the search
terms entered by the user.160 Once “sideload” returned the
search results to users, those users could connect to the thirdparty site and were given the option to click on a button
which would “sideload,” or copy, the music from the thirdparty website into their lockers without charge.161
MP3tunes maintained records of all “hits” returned for
“sideload’s” searches.162 It also kept records of the particular
users who “sideload-ed” songs from third-party sites.163 If the
154. BOB DYLAN, A Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fall, on THE FREEWHEELIN’ BOB DYLAN
(Columbia 1963).
155. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
156. Id. at 633; see also Lee, supra note 5; Singel, supra note 5. Just as Amazon’s
and Google’s plans provide a limited amount of storage for free, and users can obtain
more storage space by paying a monthly or yearly fee so could MP3tune’s subscribers.
See Tschmuck, supra note 5.
157. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 634; see also supra Part I.B.
(describing the real cloud based method of storage).
158. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
159. Id.
160. Id. Google could provide a similar service by coupling its search engine with
its locker. Lee, supra note 5.
161. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 648
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third-party website removed the song, or if the website itself
became unavailable at a later time, MP3tunes removed the
link from “sideload.”164 But, users who previously “sideloaded” music from the disabled website retained the copies they
“sideload-ed” in their “music lockers.”165
Prior to the commencement of litigation, MP3tunes
received multiple takedown notices alerting it to infringing
songs found on third-party websites available via “sideload.”166
MP3tunes responded by disabling access to the sites and
removing the links on “sideload” connecting users to those
infringing sites, but it permitted users to retain songs they
previously “sideload-ed” from the infringing sites in their
lockers.167
Continuing the trend that general awareness of
infringement could not constitute apparent knowledge,168 the
court found that “MP3tunes [was] aware that some
infringement occurs. . . . [but] did not have specific ‘red flag’
knowledge of infringement with respect to any particular link
on [“sideload”] . . . .”169 Among the evidence the court declared
insufficient to constitute “red flags” were MP3tunes’s
executives “sideload-ing” of infringing songs170 and emails
from users of MP3tunes alerting it to possible incidents of
infringement.171
Despite evidence that would make a
reasonable person likely to conclude there were further
incidents of infringement, the court found MP3tunes only had
specific “red flag” knowledge of the infringement on URLs
contained in the takedown notices.172
But, even though the court held that MP3tunes lacked
knowledge of any infringement beyond that identified in the
takedown notice, it still declared MP3tunes liable.173
164. Id. at 634. It is likely that the song or website became unavailable after being
targeted for copyright infringement.
165. Id. at 634-35.
166. Id. at 635.
167. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
168. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (C.D.
Cal. 2009).
169. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
170. Id. at 644-45.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 648.
173. Id. at 649.
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MP3tunes only disabled access to the third-party sites on
“sideload.”174 It refused to remove the songs from the users’
lockers which were “sideload-ed” from those sites.175 Since
MP3tunes maintained records allowing it to readily ascertain
which users “sideload-ed” songs from the infringing sites, it
would not need to undergo an investigation to locate the
infringement.176 Therefore, the court allowed the takedown
notice to be used as the basis to impute knowledge to
MP3tunes for the infringing “sideload-ed” songs located in
users’ lockers.177
Thus, the MP3tunes court continued the trend began by
earlier decisions previously discussed in its application of §
512(c) by employing elevated standards of apparent and
actual knowledge. The ruling, however, did offer some relief
to copyright owners, by establishing that if an OSP can track
transfers of infringing material on its service, for which it was
given a compliant takedown notice, a duty exists to remove all
of the infringing material traceable from the originally
identified location.
III. “TOMORROW NEVER KNOWS”178 THE SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE
IN § 512(C)
The courts’ standards for both actual and apparent
knowledge elevates the requirements a copyright owner must
show to eject an OSP from § 512(c)’s embrace.
Both
interpretations of actual and apparent knowledge present
copyright owners with exceptional difficulties in protecting
their works on “music lockers” because of the required
specificity demanded by courts in takedown notices.179 In
order for copyright owners to adequately protect their work on
“music lockers,” or anywhere, they must first know the scopes
of apparent and actual knowledge.

174. Id. at 635.
175. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
176. See id at 648; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1114
(9th Cir. 2007).
177. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 649; see also 17 U.S.C § 512(c)(1)(C)
(2006).
178. THE BEATLES, Tomorrow Never Knows, on REVOLVER (Parlophone 1966).
179. See Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1112.
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A. Apparent Knowledge: “Huh, Good God, What is it Good
For?, Absolutely Nothing”180
Much of the case law has grappled with what constitutes
apparent knowledge.181 Many agree the resulting standard
developed by courts creates a higher threshold than what §
512(c)’s plain language and legislative history anticipates.182
Currently, a nebulous understanding of this high threshold
exists because no copyright owner has ever succeeded when
relying on apparent knowledge to show an OSP was aware of
infringement.183
Courts consistently state that in order for apparent
knowledge to exist under the “red flag” test, a copyright owner
must show that the OSP knew of “specific instances of
infringement”184 or that the OSP “turned a blind eye to
infringement.”185 Some courts go so far as to insist that
apparent knowledge is not “what a reasonable person would
have deduced.”186 This contradicts Congress’s interpretation.
The “red flag” test proclaims apparent knowledge exists when
“infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable
person operating under the same or similar circumstances.”187
By stating that it is not “what a reasonable person would
have deduced” courts generally overlook the objective part of
the “red flag” test.188 Nowhere does the test call for the
180. EDWIN STARR, War, on HE WHO PICKS THE ROSE (Gordy 1970).
181. See Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 643-45; Viacom Int’l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148-49 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
182. Black, supra note 16 at 773; Chang, supra note 16 at 203.
183. Chang, supra note 16, at 203. Although, this may change on remand based
upon the decision by the Second Circuit that YouTube may have been willfully blind to
infringement. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012)
(discussing willful blindness in the context of the DMCA).
184. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (emphasis added); see also Capitol
Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
185. Io Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
186. Id. (citing Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D.
Wash. 2004)).
187. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44.
188. See id. The Second Circuit does note that the apparent knowledge is an
objective determination but still insists that the OSP be aware of specific incidents of
infringement. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
Yet, the objective portion of the “red flag” test, as described by Congress, does not call
for the OSP to be aware of specific incidents of infringement. As Congress explained, a
court must look at the facts and circumstances of which the OSP was aware (a
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identification of “specific instances of infringement.”189
Courts, by requiring specificity and ignoring the objective
element of the “red flag” test, have thus driven apparent
knowledge into the realm of actual knowledge.
Furthermore, the application of the “turned a blind eye to
infringement”190 test in evaluating the presence of apparent
knowledge also indicates that courts consistently require
actual instead of apparent knowledge. This standard is that
of willful blindness,191 and “the traditional rationale for the
doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are
just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”192 As
such, when a defendant is found to exhibit willful blindness,
courts declare that the defendant possesses actual knowledge
under whatever statute he or she is being prosecuted.193
Thus, those courts requiring a defendant to willfully ignore
incidents of infringement in fact mandate that the copyright
holder show actual, instead of apparent, knowledge under §
512(c)(1)(A)(ii).194
Further, the use of the tests discussed above in
determining if an OSP possess apparent knowledge creates a
redundancy in § 512(c) between actual and apparent
knowledge,195 giving both subsections the same effect,196 that
subjective question), and then, and only then, objectively determine from those facts
and circumstances whether a reasonable person would conclude infringement was
apparent. See S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 44.
189. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (emphasis added); See also S. REP.
NO. 105-190, at 44.
190. Io Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
191. Willful blindness is the “[d]eliberate avoidance of a crime, esp. by failing to
make a reasonable inquiry about suspected wrongdoing despite being aware that it is
highly probable.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). In fact, the Second Circuit
specifically condoned the use of willful blindness in determining if an OSP had
apparent knowledge. See YouTube, Inc. 676 F.3d at 34-35.
192. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063 (2011)
(emphasis added).
193. See id. at 2072 (holding that a finding of willful blindness was sufficient to
establish actual knowledge of the existence patent in a suit for patent infringement).
194. See Jane C. Ginsberg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats:
Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology
Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 598 (2008) (“‘[A]pparent’ does not mean ‘in fact
illegal,’ nor does it mean ‘conclusively exists.’ Such an interpretation would allow the
service provider to ‘turn a blind eye’ to infringements because the provider could claim
the possibility that some files might be fair use means that infringement can never be
‘apparent’ as to any file.”).
195. Brief of Appellant at 3 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir.
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is, if courts used the correct standard of actual knowledge.
Such an interpretation goes against a fundamental principle
of statutory interpretation: “that no provision should be
construed to be entirely redundant.”197 If the redundancy was
eliminated and apparent knowledge construed as intended,
general awareness of infringement could constitute apparent
knowledge under the reasonable person interpretation in the
Senate Report.198 It is difficult to imagine that apparent
knowledge cannot exist when, according to one report, 90% of
the material residing on locker services is copyrighted
material posted illegally,199 and the report further states that
illegal content download makes up 73.2% of all nonpornographic traffic from various forms of online lockers.200 If
courts correctly applied the “red flag” test, as originally
intended, apparent knowledge would likely exist with such
high percentages of infringement occurring on OSPs. It would
certainly make infringement apparent to a “reasonable person
operating under the same or similar circumstances.”201 In
fact, the defendants in Viacom and UMG Recording would
face liability if courts used such an application of the
apparent knowledge standard. 202
The present interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) leads to a
redundancy that prevents the correct application of the “red
flag” test in determining whether an OSP possesses apparent
2012) (No. 10-327).
196. The Second Circuit refuted this argument in YouTube. See YouTube, Inc., 676
F.3d at 31. The court was correct under its construction of § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii): there is
no redundancy when one examines the current interpretations of actual and apparent
knowledge employed by courts. A redundancy, however, does exist when comparing the
standard of apparent knowledge used by courts and, that of, actual knowledge as
originally envisioned by Congress.
197. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
198. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44 (1998).
199. ENVISIONAL, TECHNICAL REPORT: AN ESTIMATE OF INFRINGING
USES OF THE INTERNET 17 (2011), available at http://documents.envisional.com/
docs/Envisional-Internet_Usage-Jan2011.pdf.
200. Id. at 2. These statistics include the data for the now defunct Megaupload that
has since been charged with criminal copyright infringement along with several other
criminal offenses.
201. Brief for Appellant, supra note 195, at 5; see also S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44.
202. Viacom asserted that under such an interpretation which allowed YouTube to
succeed on summary judgment at trial allowed it to continue to operate when at least
“75-80% of views according to YouTube’s own analyses” consist of infringing material.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 195, at 2.
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knowledge. Under the courts’ heightened interpretation of
apparent knowledge it succeeds in meeting one of the dual
goals of the DMCA by ensuring OSPs will not face crushing
liability for infringement,203 but it undermines the DMCA’s
other goal, to ensure the copyright owners works “will be
protected against massive piracy.”204 The standard of the “red
flag” undermines the cooperation that § 512 meant to foster
between OSPs and copyright owners.205
B. Actual Knowledge: Does it Exist?
Due to courts elevating the standard of apparent
knowledge to that of actual knowledge, copyright owners are
left with one option: to show that an OSP possessed actual
knowledge of infringement. But just as with apparent
knowledge, courts have raised the bar for actual knowledge.
This elevation allows OSPs to operate with awareness that
infringement is occurring on their services, and in some cases
facilitate it.206
Black’s Law Dictionary states that actual knowledge
arises with “direct and clear knowledge.”207 Despite this high
standard a copyright owner would face if courts applied the
true test of actual knowledge, courts limit the language of §
512(c)(1)(A)(i) further. They require that the OSP receive a
takedown notice from the copyright owner, substantially
complying with § 512(c)(3) to evidence actual knowledge.208
203. Id. at 8.
204. Id.
205. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 40; see also Chang, supra note 16, at 219; Michael
S. Sawyer, Note, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and
the DMCA, 24 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 363, 372 (2009) (stating that the courts’
interpretation of subjective awareness under apparent knowledge could lead to OSPs
purposefully designing their sites to prevent the possibility of awareness of red flags
arising).
206. See generally Peter S. Menell & Robert L. Bridges, Jumping the Grooveshark:
A Case Study in DMCA Safe Harbor Abuse (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975579.
207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006). Compare Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that the OSP possessed actual
knowledge because it received a takedown notice), with Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (stating that the OSP
lacked actual knowledge because the OSP never received a takedown notice from the
plaintiff). Further, the Second Circuit’s decision does not indicate that this is likely to
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The Io court definitively adopted this standard when stating,
“[p]laintiff provided no notice to Veoh of any claimed
infringement. Thus, there is no question . . . that Veoh lacked
actual knowledge of the alleged infringing activity at issue.”209
While later courts have not specifically cited Io for this
proposition, they continue to apply this standard. If, as was
the case in Viacom, notice is sent to an OSP, actual
knowledge of infringement will only exist for those works
identified with a specified location despite the fact that one
can infer from the takedown that all copies of the identified
works on the site are infringing.210 Further supporting the
proposition is the fact that courts only examine whether an
OPS has actual knowledge in cases which an OSP receives a
takedown notice from the complaining copyright holder,211
and, in cases where the OSP never receives a takedown
notice, courts limit their discussion to apparent knowledge
after briefly discussing the inapplicability of actual
knowledge.212
As it stands, courts will not find the presence of actual
knowledge under § 512(c)(1)(A) unless the OSP receives a
takedown notice from the complaining copyright holder.213
Congress, however, made clear that a takedown was not
required for copyright holders to enforce their rights.214 In
fact, Congress confirmed that a takedown notice was

change because on remand the court is to examine whether YouTube had knowledge of
specific incidents of infringement based on the internal emails and reports of
YouTube’s. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2012). Yet,
nowhere does court consider that these can constitute actual knowledge, despite their
contents evidencing that the executives and employees were actually aware that
copyrighted material was posted on the site illegally. See id. at 33-34 (demonstrating
that YouTube employees knew that users had posted copyrighted material illegal on it).
209. Io Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
210. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29.
211. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 643-49
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
212. See Io Group, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
213. See Greg Jansen, Whose Burden is it Anyway? Addressing the Needs of
Content Owners in DMCA Safe Harbors, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 153, 162-63 (2010)
(claiming that courts will only find an OSP to have actual knowledge if the copyright
owner previously sent it a takedown notice pursuant to § 512(c)(3)).
214. “Under this subsection [§ 512(c)(3)], the court shall not consider such
notifications as evidence of whether the service provider has actual knowledge, is aware
of facts or circumstances . . . .” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46 (1998).
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unnecessary to evidence knowledge.215 The intersection of a
takedown notice and knowledge only establishes that if the
takedown notice is faulty by not complying with the
requirements of § 512(c)(3), it cannot be the foundation for
imputing knowledge of infringement to the OSP.216 The
courts’ interpretation of actual knowledge under §
512(c)(1)(A)(i) ignores Congress’s explicit statement that
“copyright owners are not obligated to give notification of
claimed infringement in order to enforce their rights.”217 Yet,
by requiring a takedown notice to show actual knowledge,
courts do, in fact, require notification for copyright owners to
enforce their rights.
Courts’ confusion of apparent knowledge with actual
knowledge, coupled with the heightened standard of actual
knowledge requiring the receipt of a takedown notice to show
its presence, means copyright owners must rely on their own
actions to prevent infringement. By requiring copyright
owners to issue a takedown notice in order to show that an
OSP possessed actual or apparent knowledge of infringement,
the courts place copyright holders’ rights in jeopardy,
especially on “music lockers.”
C. Liability and Protection in the Cloud: Can Copyright
Owners Protect Their Works in the Cloud
As a result of the melding of apparent knowledge and
actual knowledge, and the strict requirements to issue a
takedown notice, only two circumstances exist by which
copyright owners within the music industry can prevent
infringement on “music lockers.” The first exists where the
OSP actually based its entire business model on the premise
that its “music locker” would induce users to commit

215. “Section 512 does not require use of the notice and take-down procedure. A
service provider wishing to benefit from the limitation of liability under subsection (c)
must ‘take down’ or disable access to infringing material . . . of which it has actual
knowledge or that meets the ‘red flag’ test, even if the copyright owner or its agent does
not notify it of a claimed infringement.” Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
216. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C), (3)(B)(ii) (2011); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v.
CCBiLL L.L.C., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2007) (refusing to impute
knowledge to an OSP because notice provided by the copyright holder did not
substantially comply with § 512(c)(3)).
217. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45.
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infringement resulting in contributory liability.218
The second case involves the copyright owner first issuing
a takedown notice to the “music locker,” forcing the OSP to
remove the infringing material.219 There are two ways in
which sending the takedown notice could conclude. First, a
situation similar to that in MP3tunes could occur where, after
receiving a takedown notice, the OSP fails to adequately
respond thereby becoming liable for infringement as a result
of the imputation of knowledge disqualifying them from the
safe harbor of § 512(c).220 The other scenario results when the
OSP acts expediently by removing access to the infringing
material and thus avoids liability.221
Issuing the takedown notice, however, presents copyright
owners in the music industry with a quandary. The private
characteristic of “music lockers” makes issuing a compliant
takedown notice nearly impossible because of the need for the
identification of the specific location of infringement,222 that
is, unless the “music locker” has a feature such as MP3tunes’s
“sideload.”223 All “music lockers” permit access to a locker
only with the correct username and password. Since parties
seeking to issue takedown notices will not have access to
these keys, they are unable to issue a substantially compliant
takedown notice because the copyright owner cannot provide
the OSP with the required specificity of location.224
Due to the difficulties in issuing substantially compliant
takedown notices to “music lockers,” OSPs are allowed to
remain complacent, since they need not fear reprisal because
218. See Metro-Golwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Grokster, as a peer-to-peer file sharing platform, could not qualify for any of § 512’s safe
harbors but under the Court’s ruling any OSP whose sole purpose was to promote
infringement on their service would be contributorily liable no matter if they fit into one
of §512’s safe harbors.
219. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C), (c)(3) (2006).
220. § 512(c)(1)(C); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 627,
649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Mike Scott, Note, Safe Harbors Under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. POL’Y 99, 121 (2006).
221. The only instance in which the DMCA’s dual goals are actually fulfilled.
222. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 655 F. Supp.2d 1099, 1110
(C.D. Cal. 2009).
223. See Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 2d at 648-49; see also supra Part II.B.
(discussing the function of “sideload”).
224. See § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C. 488 F. Supp. 2d
1102, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2007); Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 642-42; Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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the courts’ heightened knowledge standards. This results
from the fact that OSPs “have no affirmative duty to police
their users”225 and “the DMCA notification procedures place
the burden of policing copyright infringement . . . squarely on
the owners of the copyright.”226 The burden resting on the
copyright owners to prevent infringement, and their inability
to issue the takedown notices to “music lockers,” allows the
OSPs to ignore users’ infringement, thereby, creating a safe
harbor for infringement on “music lockers.”
IV. A BALANCE OF INTERESTS IN PREVENTING INFRINGEMENT
“Music lockers” were unanticipated technology in 1998
when Congress passed the DMCA. While “music lockers” fit
neatly into the definition of an OSP which qualifies for the
safe harbor of § 512(c), the nature of “music lockers” make a
copyright owner’s remedies in the section largely irrelevant.
Instead, what is needed to both prevent the crushing liability
feared by OSPs and to ensure that the music industry is
compensated for the use of its copyrighted works, is an
alternative solution to the one provided by the DMCA.
Without an adequate system in place to provide those who
own the musical copyrights with compensation, revenues will
continue to drop as the Internet increasingly becomes the
dominant vehicle for music commerce.227 This could result in
the failure of one of copyright law’s primary goals – to
promote the arts228 – by diminishing the incentive of artists to
produce new musical works.

225. Capitol Records, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d at 637. But see Ginsberg, supra note
194, at 597 (“§ 512(m)’s dispensation of service providers from ‘affirmatively seeking
facts indicating infringing activity,’ should not entitle a service provider to remain
militantly ignorant.”).
226. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108
(C.D. Cal. 2009).
227. For the first time digital downloads of music eclipsed physical sales for the
music industry in 2011. The Nielson Company & Billboard’s 2011 Music Industry
Report, DIGITALMUSIC.ORG (Jan. 06, 2012), http://digitalmusic.org/blog/the-nielsencompany-billboards-2011-music-industry-report.
228. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

PAVLICK_MUSIC LOCKERS

278

1/31/2013 5:26 PM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.1

A. The Audio Home Recording Act: Framework for A Future
The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992229 (AHRA) could
provide Congress with the guidelines to build a new statute
giving copyright holders in the music industry their desired
compensation for the storage of their songs on “music lockers”
without resulting in the liability feared of by OSPs. The Act
provides that two percent of the transfer price of every
“digital audio device imported into and distributed in the
United States” is to be collected for royalty payments, and
payable by the first person to manufacture and distribute the
device.230
Previously, commentators suggested adding computers to
the list of digital recording devices,231 but this casts the net
too wide because not every computer is employed for music
purposes. Instead, the better targets are “music lockers”
themselves.
Requiring the OSPs to distribute a select
percentage of their revenues to copyright owners would
remedy copyright holders concerns about the lack of
compensation for the use of their works.232 In addition, a
provision similar to the AHRA pertaining to “music lockers”
would also assuage OSPs’ fears of crushing liability. This is
because under the AHRA, when a party fails to remit the
required fees, that party only becomes liable for the
statutorily imposed royalty payments233 rather than facing
the imposition of damages for infringement,234
The more difficult question in employing such a scheme is
its application to cloud storage services not solely devoted to
the storage of songs.235 In such circumstances, a yearly audit
could be conducted to determine the percentage of such
229. See 17 U.S.C. § 1004 (2006).
230. § 1004(a)(1).
231. See Aldrich, supra note 3, at 15.
232. Some “music lockers” do not charge users for storage, however, these locker
make their profits from ad revenue which can still be sizable. YouTube, whose main
source of revenue is ads, made $450,000 million in revenue in 2009. Ryan Lawler,
YouTube Revenues More Than Doubled in 2010, GIGAOM.COM (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://www.gigaom.com/video/youtube-revenues-doubled.
233. “[A]ctual damages shall constitute the royalty payments that should have been
paid . . . the court, in its discretion, may award an additional amount of not to exceed 50
percent of the actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 1009(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
234. “No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of
copyright . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006).
235. Such services include Livedrive, the rackspace cloud, Mozy, and dropbox.
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lockers which are employed to store music. That percentage
could then be the basis for calculating the required remittance
of royalties to copyright owners.
B. “Do You Realize??”236 The Need for a New Statutory License
Another possible solution is the creation of a new statutory
license. Contained within the Copyright Act are numerous
sections which create compulsory licenses for the use of
copyrighted works.237 Anyone wishing to use a copyrighted
musical work may do so simply by following the procedure
prescribed within the statutory license.
Storing songs in “music lockers” does not fall under the
canopy of § 114, the compulsory license for the distribution by
public performance of a digital audio record,238 since
streaming music is not considered a public performance,239
and the argument that “music lockers” provide public
performances is even more tenuous.
A clarification
establishing when a license is required to utilize or profit from
an artist’s copyrighted musical works on “music lockers” is
achievable through a new statutory license in the Copyright
Act.
A new section can be instituted requiring a license for
“music lockers” wishing to store copyrighted works on its
service based on § 115, the compulsory license for making and
distributing sound recordings.240 As such, the OSP need not
obtain permission from the copyright owners to operate a
music locker; it only needs to provide the required notice that
it intends to exercise its right to use the musical work.241
After providing the copyright owner notice, the OSP would
need to ensure that the statutorily prescribed licensing fees
were submitted to the correct parties.242 If the fees failed to
be remitted, only then would the OSP face liability for
236. THE FLAMING LIPS, Do You Realize, on YOSHIMI BATTLES THE PINK ROBOTS
(Warner Bros. 2002).
237. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122 (2006).
238. § 114.
239. United States v. ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64, 73 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert. denied 132 S.
Ct. 366 (2011).
240. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
241. See § 115(b).
242. See § 115(c)(5).
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copyright infringement.243
The applicable rates for a license can be determined just
as under § 115. The rate can be freely negotiated between the
copyright owners and the OSP, or if a licensing rate cannot be
agreed upon, they would be required to use the reasonable
rates as determined by the Copyright Royalty Judges.244 On
the possibility that rates, as determined by the Royalty
Judges, would appear unfair to the OSP, for instance where
the storage service was not solely devoted to store songs, then
either the copyright owner or OSP could challenge the fees set
by the Royalty Judges in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.245
CONCLUSION
The use of Internet applications to commit infringement
consistently denies copyright owners the compensation to
which they are entitled. “Music lockers,” more so than other
online services, present copyright with more pernicious
complications in combating infringement. The heightened
standards of knowledge developed by the courts in construing
§ 512(c) lie at the heart of these difficulties. Without
legislative intervention, “music lockers” have the capability of
becoming safe harbors for infringement just as § 512(c)
provides safe harbors to “music lockers.”

243. See § 115(c)(6).
244. See § 115(c)(3)(D). For an interesting decision holding the insulation from
removal violated the Appointments Clause, see Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
245. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d) (2006).d

